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1 Introduction
As is widely acknowledged today, a key difference between universities and professional schools
(or other actors in the higher education system) is that only the first ones count teaching and
research as part of their core social goals. In this respect evaluating the performance of any
university system calls for answering at least two questions. Do universities manage to combine
high quality teaching and high quality research? And, if they do, how? Obviously, one would
like to see any university to excell in both dimensions but beyond wishful thinkings, very little
is known about how to effectively realize this ideal. On the one hand, evidences from UK (see
Shattock, 2002) suggest that universities that perform very best in research also perform best in
teaching. On the other hand, it is hard to see how things are going in those universities which
are not in the Top 10. The situation is even more opaque in many continental systems where
university assessement is in its very enfancy.
Fortunately enough, combining high quality teaching and high quality research is actually
desirable for the universities themselves. This is in particular true in a system where universities
are mostly financed on a per student basis and where students’ choice depend on (1) teaching
quality and (2) university’s prestige (which is related to research quality). However, combining
high quality teaching and high quality research is often viewed as a challenge or a source of
conflicts within universities taken as an aggregate.
This is partly due to the individual incentives faced by academics. For them, research and
teaching activities are most often substitutes. Moreover, in many education systems, academics
benefit from a large discretion in the allocation of their working time. Tavernier and Wilkin
(2001) show that academics do use this discretion to a large extent, resulting in very different
occupation profile for academics. Accordingly the actual splitting of their time among the
various tasks they are assigned to is largely a matter of taste and incentives. There are a priori
many ways by which a university could reconcile the individual conflict between teaching and
research faced by its academics and the vital interest of performing well in both dimensions in
the aggregate. Promoting specialization, with some academics being teaching professors and
others full time researchers is a possible solution. Designing incentives schemes that value both
aspects simultaneously is another one. However, there are also constraints limiting what can be
actually implemented. Suppose for instance that at the individual level high quality research
and high quality teaching are complements, i.e. in order to be a good professor, one must also be
a good researcher. Then the ”specialization” route must be abandoned. Suppose instead that
research and teaching quality are not equally easy to assess. Then, the actual implementation
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of targeted schemes is hampered. In the context of an emergent market for academics, a similar
argument could be made whenever research and teaching abilities are not equally easy to signal
to alternative employers.
As a matter of fact, the tensions between teaching and research have not been widely studied
in the economic literature. A few exceptions are worth being pointed out. Del Rey (2001) models
competition between universities who decide on the allocation of funds between teaching and
research activities. In her model, teaching achievements and research records enter the university
objective function and funding is positively related to the number of students. She studies the
balance between research and teaching efforts as a function of the funding rules. However, a
key feature of her analysis is that academics and university authority share the same objective.
De Fraja and Iossa (2002) point out that increased students’ mobility favors the emergence of
”elite” institutions, i.e. a limited number of high research record universities co-existing with
other universities focusing on teaching activities. Beath et al. (2003) focus on the tensions
between pure and applied research under binding budget constraints. However, the teaching
side of the academics’ job is not considered in their paper.
In this note, we start from the agency relationship that links academics to their authority
(rectorate, deans,...). Specifically, we focus on the links between the multitasking nature of a
professor-university relationship and the multi-unit nature of these universities. The paper is
organized around two simple ideas. First, at the aggregate level, universities share key features
with conglomerate firms. Indeed, universities are active in multiple fields: science, economics,
law, ... Each field is organized within one department, with more or less autonomy. To a
large extent, research and teaching are discipline-specific and the decisions made regarding
some discipline are largely independent from those taken in other disciplines.1 In addition,
universities are headed by a central authority which in particular has the final decision on the
allocation of funds. Most often, the budget is centralized and the resource constraint applies
at the university level. It means that the allocation of resources is done at the university level
too. Thus, universities rely on an internal financing system which is very similar to the internal
capital market of a conglomerate firm (see Coupe´, 2001). Such practices are widely documented
and to a certain extent can be viewed as socially desirable. University completeness is sometime
believed to be part of a university’s mission (and this argument might be sufficient to justify a
(possibly inefficient) form of redistribution). However, the ensuing solidarity between ”cash-cow”
departments and smaller units does not go without tensions.
The second building block of our analysis is the relationship between academics and author-
1This is in particularily true if students choose first a discipline and second a university where they attend.
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ities. We view it as a multitask agency problem. The university authority wants to provide
incentives on the two dimensions of teaching and research and we take it a an assumption that
academics must perform teaching and research. While teaching and research require some effort,
we assume that research is more valuable to the academic than teaching. This might simply
reflect the tastes of the academic but there are more fundamental reasons for that. In particu-
lar, the emergence of a market for academics induces more severe career concerns. As a matter
of fact, while the quality of individual research output is reasonably easily assessed, teaching
quality is most often evaluated at the level of a whole program, rather than at a individual level.
Therefore, an academic is likely to put more effort on research than teaching because research
outputs are more easily appropriable than teaching efforts.2 All in all, inducing effort on the
teaching task might be more difficult to achieve than on the research task.
Consider now the issue of funding. If a university’s funding mostly depends on the number of
students and if these students are (at least partially) responsive to the reputation of university
programs, it is especially crucial to ensure high teaching quality. Because more funds allow
for a better research environment, good teaching performance makes high research records less
costly. Thus, even if academics dislike teaching, they may exert a significant effort on improving
teaching quality because, by attracting students, they will obtain funds that will make high
research records less costly. Think of an extreme case where each academic is totally independent:
he teaches the students who choose to attend his courses and finances his research with their
enrolment fees. Clearly, whatever strong her distaste for teaching might be, the academic has
to teach if she wants her research to be funded.
How does the conglomerate nature of a university affect the previous argument? Obviously,
the problem comes from the possibility of reallocating funds dedicated to research between the
different departments. The presence of such an internal market for research funds makes it more
costly to induce teaching effort. First, because of an insurance effect (even if one does not raise
any fund it will benefit from research funding). Second, because the marginal value of effort is
smaller (because only part of the funds raised through teaching effort will be appropriated ex
post). In a multi-department university, teaching efforts can be viewed as private resources spent
at contributing to the constitution of a common resource. Self-interested academics are therefore
very likely to free-ride on such efforts. On the other hand, because it is a conglomerate, the
university may organize yardstick competition between academics for the allocation of research
2Moreover, the evaluation of research quality through publication scores or patents holdings is much easy to
establish from outside the university and to transmit than the quality of teaching, which requires internal access
to the institution.
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funds. When such a yardstick competition is at work, high quality research by an academic
is likely to induce high effort by the others. Because it induces both free-riding and yardstick
competition, a mutli-unit organization for the university might a priori be thought of as a ”good”
with respect to research quality and a ”bad” with respect to teaching efforts.
However, we show hereafter that the conflict between research and teaching may actually
be resolved within the multi-unit institution. Under well-designed incentive schemes, teaching
efforts and research efforts may remain complementary in the multi-unit organization, even if
there are no cost synergies between the two activities. Then, the relevant issue is to compare
the multi-unit university with a collection of independent departments. Does the redistribution
inherent to the multi-unit form allows for a better performance in research, in teaching or
both? If not, what are the trade-offs? In this respect, our key result is the following: the
conglomerate nature of universities may actually be instrumental in promoting the quality of the
teaching-research bundle as compared to a collection of single departments.
Notice that, by focusing on the tensions between teaching and research, we abstract from
other important problems. For instance, we neglect the implications of the now standard dis-
tinction between pure and applied research (see Jensen and Thursby, 2001) on performance
assessment. We also overlook the third and fourth basic tasks an academic is asked to perform,
namely service to the society and administrative duties. (Tavernier and Wilkin (2001) show that
these activities may indeed crowd out a significant share of an academic’s time).
The paper is organized as follows. First, we develop our stylized model. This is done
in section 2. Section 3 characterizes optimal contracts and their implications for the relation
between teaching and research. Comparative statics results are also dealt with in this section.
Section 4 discusses the limitations of our analysis as well as possible extensions.
2 The Model
We consider a university with N ≥ 2 departments. Each department is personified by a unique
professor, the so-called ”academic”. There are N + 1 players: N professors and one university
dean. Thus, we only consider a two layers hierarchy: University-dean and professors.3
Professors allocate their time between two activities: teaching and research. The vector
a = (a1, a2) is the vector of actions where a1 refers to teaching effort and a2 refers to research
3Obviously, reality is more complex. Universities display multiple layers hierarchy. However, the present
simplification allows us to combine the mutlitasking issues faced by academics with the redistribution problem in
a tractable model.
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effort. Performing a level of action a costs the professor C(a). The cost function is increasing
and convex in both arguments. No a priori restrictions are made about the sign of the cross
derivative: ∂∂C(a)∂a1∂a2 . A positive (negative) sign would reflect negative (positive) synergies between
the two activities.
Each professor is endowed with a vector of ”talent”. This vector represents the professor’s
ability to do research and teaching. Talents are denoted by a two-dimensional vector η = (η1, η2),
where the first element represents the professor’s teaching talent and the second, the professor’s
research talent.
A variable θi identifies a proxy for the quality of the research projects undertaken by professor
i. It depends on the effort in research activity and on the professor’s research talent:
θi = f(a2i, η2i)
with ∂f∂a2i > 0,
∂f
∂η2i
> 0, and research effort and talent are not perfect substitutes: ∂∂f∂a2i∂η2i > 0.
A research project of quality θi leads to a research output only if it is combined with financial
resources.
Students’ choice is not explicitely modeled, however we assume that ni, the number of
students in discipline i, depends on teaching quality in field i. Quality itself depends on the
combination of teaching effort and teaching talent of professor i. Hence we assume:
ni = g(a1i, η1i)
with ∂g∂a1i > 0,
∂g
∂η1i
> 0. Like for research, we assume that talent and effort are not perfect
substitutes: ∂∂g∂a1i∂η1i > 0. Teaching efforts contribute to the constitution of the general budget
of the university through enrollment fees.
Academics receive a fixed wage v from the university. For simplicity, this fixed pay is
normalized to zero. In addition, there is a reward w proportional to the research output.
Denoting research output by the variable ri, we assume the utility of professor i is given by:
Ui = wri − C(a)
wri could be interpreted either as a private benefit from research or as a future job opportunity,
i.e. the professor’s value on the academic market. In the first interpretation, wri represents the
private benefits an academic enjoys from his research achievement. Private benefits of research
could be notoriety, job opportunities, consultancy contracts, tenure position... Clearly, in all
these examples, the benefit is tied to the academic’s research output. What is specific in this
model is the linear specification of the private benefit.
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Alternatively, wri can be interpreted as the academic’s market value. Professorships exhibit
nowadays high mobility and high turnovers4 with the consequence that there is today a true
market for academics (see Siow (1995) on the organization of the market for professors). The
value of an academic on this market is largely influenced by his research performance. High
research achievement signals high quality (high talent) to prospective employers. Hence, a
high research output ri translates into better job opportunities and a larger pay. Under this
interpretation, our model assumes that the market for academics values research at a per unit
price of w. The professor’s value wri can be interpreted as his future reservation wage, either
inside his institution or elsewhere.5
Notice that teaching activity does not enter positively in the professor’s utility function. This
rather extreme assumption is meant to capture the idea that teaching is valuable inside a given
university but it has little value outside. For instance, it might be difficult to signal to the job
market high teaching quality. By contrast, research has a high visibility outside university, and
can be used as a signal of quality (talent) on the market. Hence, the private benefit associated
to the research output and the absence of private benefit associated with teaching. Clearly, this
assumption makes the worst case for teaching efforts. We will relax this assumption in section
4, and consider the case where the academic market values both the research achievement and
the teaching quality.
Last, we assume that the academic talent is perfectly known inside the university but it is
not outside. This is a simplifying assumption, which allow us to consider a deterministic model
where uncertainty is absent. Note that all academics are identical in this model, except for
talents.
Regarding Universities, we assume the following. The budget of the university is noted by B.
The university receives a fixed transfer F from the government and a tuition fee s per student.
In state owned systems, the tuition is partially paid by the government. B is then equal to:
B = F + s
N∑
k=1
nk
In the remaining of the paper, we consider the budget B as the total amount of resources
available for funding research projects. Meaning that B is the university’s resources net of the
academic’s wages (normalized to zero) and all the other spending of a university (which could
account for a large amount).
4See in particular the recent contribution of Ehrenberg (2003)
5Note that this part of the professor’s reward is delayed. It represents the future pay prospect of a professor,
hence, it does not need to be paid immediately out of the university’s budget. Clearly, this interpretation bears
some resemblance with career concerns models. This is discussed in section 4.
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The research output of professor i is denoted by ri. It depends on (i) the project’s quality
θi and (ii) the budget yi allocated to research in department i. Research budget includes
labs, research assistants, sabbatical year,... The production function for research output is the
following:
ri = θiv(yi) ∀ i = 1, ..., N.
The function v(.) is increasing and concave. The concavity of the v(.) function implies that the
allocation of the research budget to the departments will not be of the form ”winner takes all”.
Moreover, we assume that the derivative v′ is homogenous of degree −h < 0. This is equivalent
to assume that v(y) = y1−h. Note that to simplify the analysis, we consider that the production
function is not department specific. This however does not mean that all academics are identical
with respect to the research activity since heterogeneity could be incorporated in the academic’s
research talent η2i. Indeed talent could be interpreted either as a specific academic talent or as
a field specific talent (or both). The same is true for teaching.
This specification for the budget takes as constant other forms of funding which are to a large
extent accessible to a university (typically institutional research fundings by federal or private
agencies). Notice also that we assume that departments do not compete among themselves for
students. In other words, students are assumed to choose first their field of studies and then
their university. Teaching effort affects the choice of the university, not the field chosen.
Within this framework, we may now specify the internal financing rules of the university and
the timing of the events.
1. The Academics simultaneously choose the actions ai.
2. Students choose their university and the values of ni and θi are observed.
3. Given the qualities of the research projects and the total budget, the university allocates
the research budget to Academics.
Underlying this game structure, the following assumptions are made: the university cannot
commit ex-ante (that is before the professors choose the actions) to a particular sharing of the
university budget. Thus, the budget will be allocated ex-post (once ni and θi are realized). We
assume that ex-post, the university allocates funds to research projects in order to maximize the
aggregate research output
∑N
k=1 rk. In other words, commitment to a pre-specified distribution
rule is not feasible. Actually, commitment to a particular distribution rule ex-ante would be
highly demanding. Ex-ante, the university should indeed be able to specify the allocation of
resources given all possible realizations of θk and nk, k = 1, ..., N . Such a rule would be a
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mapping from the N2-dimensional space of projects quality and students’ numbers to the N -
dimensional space of investments. It is reasonable to assume that the costs of writing such an
allocation rule are prohibitive.6 Moreover, ex-post, the university would still have an incentive
to re-negotiate such an arrangement to allocate its scare funds to the more valuable projects i.e.
to maximize the aggregate research output given the budget.7
Lack of commitment implies that we do not need to specify the objective of the university be-
yond maximization the aggregate research output given the budget. The allocation of resources
by the university will then be similar to the winner-picking contest of Stein (1997).8 The analo-
gies between our model of multi-department universities and models analyzing conglomerate
-for profit- firms will be discussed further in the last section. The specificity of our analysis is
to integrate the multi-tasking nature of the incentive problem, which we view as inherent to the
academic job. Be it for teaching or research, the quality of the output essentially results from
the academic’s effort and an academic should perform both tasks.
3 TheTrade-off between Research and Teaching Efforts
3.1 Optimal Efforts
At the last stage of the game, given the budgetB and the value of research projects (θ1, ..., θi, ..., θN ),
the university allocates B in order to maximize the research output. At the last stage of the
game, the university then solves:
max
y1,...,yN
N∑
k=1
rk Subject to:
N∑
k=1
yk = B. (P1)
We may then specifiy the optimal allocation rule for the university budget.
PROPOSITION 3.1 The optimal allocation of the budget is: for all i ∈ N
yi = αiB
where αi =
θ
1
h
i∑N
k=1
θ
1
h
k
6For references on the cost of writing contracts, see Tirole (1999).
7In section 4 we discuss the case where the university can fully commit ex-ante to a simple redistribution rules
where a fraction γ of the budget is allocated according to the projects’ relative quality and a fraction 1− γ of the
budget is allocated according to the number of students. This rule may improve the global performance of the
university.
8”Simply put, individual projects must compete for the scarce funds, and the headquarters’ job is to pick the
winners and the losers in this competition.” Stein (1997), p111.
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Proof The first order conditions for problem (P.1) are:
θiv
′(yi) = λ
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the budget constraint. Recalling that v′ is
homogenoeus of degree −h, we have v′(yi) = (1− h)y−hi . Solving for yi we obtain:
yi =
λ
−1
h
(1− h)−1h
θ
1
h
i .
Summing over all departments we obtain:
N∑
k=1
yk =
λ
−1
h
(1− h)−1h
N∑
k=1
θ
1
h
k
Given that
∑N
k=1 yk = B, we have:
B∑N
k=1 θ
1
h
k
=
λ
−1
h
(1− h)−1h
Replacing λ
−1
h
(1−h)
−1
h
by yi
θ
1
h
i
, we have finally: yi =
θ
1
h
i∑N
k=1
θ
1
h
k
B.
Our assumptions on v(.) imply that the shares of the budget α are independent of the size
of the budget. From proposition 3.1 the following comparative static results are immediate:
Corollary 3.1 The optimal allocation of the budget satisfies the following:
∂αi
∂θi
> 0 (3.1)
∂αi
∂θj
< 0 (3.2)
In other words, the resource allocation process is based on the relative quality of research projects,
an effect which is typical in winner pricking contest.9 This means that in a Multi-Department
University (hereafter MDU), quality of project i alone cannot explain the budget allocated to
professor i. In a MDU, budget allocation depends on the quality of all projects. As we will
see, this allocation scheme, which is specific to a MDU, creates yardstick competition between
academics and as such, is an important part of the incentive package.
9”Specifically, the extent to which any given project gets funded in an internal capital market will depend
not only on that project’s own absolute merits, but also on its merits relative to other projects in the company’s
overall portfolio.” Stein (1997), page 112.
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University behaviour in the last stage is perfectly anticipated by academics. Using Propo-
sition 3.1, we may now analyze the first stage of the game. Integrating the optimal budget
allocation scheme, the professor i’s utility function is:
Ui = w[θiv(αiB)]− C(a)
Let us denote,
• Cali is the partial derivative of C(ai) with respect to ali, l = 1, 2,
• α′i is the partial derivative of αi with respect to θi.
where indices i referring to professor i. First order conditions read as follows:
Ca1i = w[θiv
′(αiB)αi]
∂B
∂a1i
(3.3)
Ca2i = w[v(αiB) + θiv
′(αiB)α′iB]
∂θi
∂a2i
(3.4)
The right hand sides of (3.3) and (3.4) are respectively the marginal benefit of teaching effort
and research effort. We assume that there exists a unique solution to this system.10 We denote
this solution a∗1i and a∗2i. Obviously, an increase in the marginal benefit of task l leads to an
increase of a∗li, l = 1, 2. We now state:
LEMMA 3.1 Ignoring potential (positive or negative) synergies on cost, research and teaching
are complementary activities: ∂a1i∂a2i > 0
Proof: Take the derivative of the LHS of (3.3) with respect to a2i. The sign of the expression
is given by:
v′(αiB)αi + θiv′(αiB)α′i + θiv
′′(αiB)αiα′iB (3.5)
Only the last term in this expression is negative (since v(.) is concave and α′i > 0). A sufficient
condition for a positive sign of (3.5) is: v′(αiB) > −v′′(αiB)αiB, which is always true given the
assumption on v(.). Note that we could reach the same result by taking the derivative of (3.3)
with respect to a1i; the sign of this expression is obviously given by (3.5).
The previous Lemma shows that the multi-unit structure of the university preserves the
complementary nature of teaching and research efforts.11. Obviously, a necessary condition for
10Since v(.) is strictly concave and C(.) is convex, a sufficient condition for the program to be globally concave
is that efforts are weak substitutes.
11This result is established for the case where there are no synergies on cost. However, it is clear that the result
is preserved even if there exist negative synergies between teaching and research activities
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this result is that some link is preserved, through financing rules, between efforts in the first stage
and the scope for rewards in the second stage. We are now in a position to address our key issue,
i.e. assess the efficiency of a conglomerate form for the university. Since under our assumptions,
there exists no synergies between departments outside those resulting from the budget sharing,
any difference between a SDU (single department university) and a MDU (multi department
university) is explained by the organizational form of the university.
3.2 SDU and MDU
In a single department university (SDU), there is no budget allocation scheme, since there is
only one research project available: y = B. The professor’s utility is then:
U = w[θv(B)]− C(a)
Take the first order condition to derive the optimal teaching and research levels:
Ca1 = w[θv
′(B)]
∂B
∂a1
(3.6)
Ca2 = w[v(B)]
∂θ
∂a2
(3.7)
Compare first the marginal benefit of teaching in a multi vs a single department university
(equations (3.3) and (3.6)). Everything else being equal (the research budget B in a single
department university equals αiB in a multi department university; and the value of the research
project), the marginal benefit of teaching in a multi department university is αi < 1 times the
marginal benefit in a single department. Hence, a multi department university (MDU) provides
the teachers with less incentives to do teaching.
The reason is that the budget is a pure private good in a SDU while it tends to be a common
resource in a MDU. If in a SDU any additional resource created by attracting more students
is invested in the department’s research project, in a MDU, any additional resource goes to
the common pool of resources from which department i gets only a fraction αi < 1. Hence an
academic can only appropriate a fraction αi of the additional budget.
An insurance effect is also at play in our framework. Indeed, the availability of funds within
the university affects the marginal benefit of teaching through the term v′(αiB). By concavity
of v(.), the larger the budget, the lower the marginal benefit of teaching. An academic would
have lower incentives to teach if its university is endowed with a large budget B and conversely
a low budget stimulates teaching effort. Lemma 3.2 will more clearly illustrate this effect.
Turning to the comparison of marginal benefits of research in a MDU and a SDU (equations
(3.4) and (3.7)), we note the additional term θiv′(αiB)αi′B ∂θi∂a2i in (3.4). This term is positive.
11
Hence, everything else being equal (the research budget B in a single department university
equals αiB in a multi department university), the marginal benefit of a research effort is larger
in a MDU than in a SDU.
The additional term in (3.4) measures the competitive effect of having a MDU. In a MDU,
professors compete for the research budget. Given that the budget allocation scheme is based
on the relative quality of projects, the professors have to produce higher quality research to
grab the resources from the university. The competition for research funding, as induced by the
MDU structure, leads to an increase of research quality.
Summing up, integrating departments in a MDU creates free riding on teaching and yardstick
competition on research. We have shown that MDU provides more incentives to do research and
less incentives for teaching than SDU. Does it mean that MDU have a better research and a lower
quality teaching than SDU. The answer is no. There are two reasons for the negative answer:
first, lower quality teaching reduces the university’s budget and hence, it reduces the research
quality. It also reduces the incentives to do research (lemma 3.1). Second, again following lemma
3.1, the increase in incentives to do research increases the incentives to do teaching.
Hence, is it possible that a MDU offers a better quality teaching and performs better research
than a SDU. The reverse could also be true. Last, it is also possible that MDU performs better
on one dimension only. However, the next proposition shows that a MDU cannot perform
better than a SDU on the teaching side only. To establish this result, we compare a MDU with
a collection of SDU replicating the MDU’s departments.
PROPOSITION 3.2 If for all i = 1, ..., N , aMDU1i > a
SDU
1 then a
MDU
2i > a
SDU
2
PROOF: Each academic i performs more teaching effort in a MDU than in a SDU if:
θMDUi v
′(αiBMDU )αi > θSDUi v
′(BSDU ) (3.8)
Replacing v′(y) by (1− h)y−h, we have:
θMDUi α
1−h
i (B
MDU )−h > θSDUi (B
SDU )−h (3.9)
Since αi < 1 and BMDU > BSDU as we posit that all academic are doing more teaching effort,
a necessary condition for (3.9) to hold is that θMDUi > θ
SDU
i . But this precisely means that for
all i, aMDU2i > a
SDU
2 . And it completes the proof.
Proposition 3.2 shows that a necessary condition for having more teaching effort in all de-
partments is to have more research in all departments. However, depending on the distribution
of talents, it is possible that in some department, a MDU has a better performance while in
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other department a MDU does worse. Unfortunately, we have not been able to solve the model
for a general characterization of the occurence of the various cases. We propose hereafter an
example which allows to discuss the basic intuitions underlying the general trade-off between
teaching and research incentives.
3.3 An Example
Let us assume that each academic is characterized by a vector ηi = (η1i, η2i) of talent. The
research output in department i is ri(θi, yi) = θiy1−hi , with h < 1 where θi = a2iη2i. We assume
that all the academics are identical with respect to talent. This means that ηi = (η1, η2), ∀i.
The university is financed exclusively by a per-student fee s. The number of students in
department i is ni(a1i, η1i) = a1iη1. Hence the total budget is B = sη1
∑N
k=1 a1k.
We assume that the costs of teaching and research efforts are separable. Specifically, we
assume C(ai) =
a21i
2 +
a2i2
2 .
In a Single Division University, the optimal behaviour of the academic is obtained by solving
the following program:
max
a1,a2
w[θB1−h]− C(a)
The first order conditions are:
w[θ(1− h)(sη1a1)−h](sη1) = a1 (3.10)
w[(sη1a1)1−h]η2 = a2. (3.11)
Solving them for the efforts we obtain:
aSDU1 = (1− h)
1
2hw
1
h η
1
h
2 (sη1)
1−h
h (3.12)
aSDU2 = (1− h)
1−h
2h w
1
h η
1
h
2 (sη1)
1−h
h (3.13)
In a Multi department university each academic i solves:
max
a1i,a2i
w[θi(αiB)1−h]− C(ai)
where B = sη1
∑N
k=1 a1k, αi is given in proposition 3.1: αi =
θ
1
h
i∑N
k=1
θ
1
h
k
and α′i is given by:
α′i =
∂αi
∂θi
=
1
h
θ
1
h
i θ
−1
i
∑N
k=1,k 6=i θ
1
h
k
(
∑N
k=1 θ
1
h
k )2
=
1
hθi
αi
N∑
k=1,k 6=i
αk > 0 (3.14)
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The first order conditions are:
w[θi(1− h)(sη1αi
N∑
k=1
a1k)−h](sη1αi) = a1i (3.15)
w[(sη1αi
N∑
k=1
a1k)1−h + θi(1− h)(sη1αi
N∑
k=1
a1k)−h(sη1
N∑
k=1
a1k)α′i]η2 = a2i (3.16)
Using the facts that all academics are identical, we can replace
∑N
k=1 a1k by Na1i, αi by
1
N
and α′i by
1
hθi
αi(1− αi) = 1hθi N−1N2 .
Simplifying and solving the system for the efforts a1i and a2i we obtain an explicit relation
between optimal values in the single division university and a multi division one:
aMDU1i = (1− h)
1
2hw
1
h η
1
h
2 (sη1)
1−h
h
1
N
1
h
(
N + h− 1
h
)
1
2h = aSDU1 g1(N) (3.17)
aMDU2 = (1− h)
1−h
2h w
1
h η
1
h
2 (sη1)
1−h
h
1
N
1
h
(
N + h− 1
h
)
1+h
2h = aSDU2 g2(N) (3.18)
It follows that
aMDU1i > a
SDU
1 ⇔ g1(N) > 1
aMDU2i > a
SDU
2 ⇔ g2(N) > 1.
with g1(N) = 1
N
1
h
(N+h−1h )
1
2h and g2(N) = 1
N
1
h
(N+h−1h )
1+h
2h . Moreover, direct computations yield
rMDUi > r
SDU ⇔ g2(N)g1(N)1−h > 1
Proposition 3.3 summarizes our findings:
PROPOSITION 3.3 For all h < 1, it exists N1 < N r < N2, with N r > 1 and N1 ≥ 1 if
h ≤ 12 such that
• ∀N ∈ [1,Max[1, N1]], we have aMDU1i ≥ aSDU1 , aMDU2i ≥ aSDU2 , and rMDUi ≥ rSDU
• ∀N ∈ [Max[1, N1], N r], we have aMDU1i ≤ aSDU1 , aMDU2i ≥ aSDU2 , and rMDUi ≥ rSDU
• ∀N ∈ [N r, N2], we have aMDU1i ≤ aSDU1 , aMDU2i ≥ aSDU2 , and rMDUi ≤ rSDU
• ∀N ≥ N2, we have aMDU1i ≤ aSDU1 , aMDU2i ≤ aSDU2 , and rMDUi ≤ rSDU
PROOF: The equation g1(N) = 1 is equivalent to −hN2 + N + h − 1 = 0. The roots of
this second degree equations are: N = 1 and N = N1 = 1−hh . g1(N) is larger than one when
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N lies in between the two roots. When h > 12 , N
1 < 1, hence for all N > 1, g1(N) < 1 and
aMDU1i < a
SDU
1 . When h ≤ 12 , N1 ≥ 1, hence for all N ∈ [1, N1], g1(N) ≥ 1 and aMDU1i ≥ aSDU1 ,
and for all N > N1, g1(N) < 1 and aMDU1i < a
SDU
1 .
The equation g2(N) = 1 is equivalent to −hN
2
1+h + N + h − 1 = 0. We first show that if
h < 1, this equation has two roots in the interval [1,+∞[: N = 1 and N2 > 1. First, N = 1 is
clearly a root of this equation. Second, −hN 21+h +N + h is increasing up to N = (1+h2h )
1−h
1+h > 1
and decreasing after. Hence, there is another root N2 > 1. g2(N) is larger than one when N lies
in between the two roots 1 and N2. Hence for all N ∈ [1, N2], g2(N) ≥ 1 and aMDU2i ≥ aSDU2 ,
and for all N > N2, g2(N) < 1 and aMDU2i < a
SDU
2 .
The root N2 is larger than N1. Indeed, g2(N) = g1(N)(N+h−1h )
1
2 . Clearly g2(N) > g1(N)
for all N > 1. Hence, when g1(N1) = 1, g2(N1) is still larger than one.
The equation g1(N)1−hg2(N) = 1 is equivalent to −hN2−h +N + h− 1 = 0. For h < 1, this
equation has two roots in the interval [1,+∞[: N = 1 and N r > 1. The analysis is similar to
the equation g2(N) = 1: −hN2−h + N + h − 1 = 0 increases up to N = ( 1h(2−h))
1
1−h > 1 and
decreases after. Hence for all N ∈ [1, N r], rMDU ≥ rSDU , and for all N > N r rMDU < rSDU
Last, the root N r lies in between N1 and N2. Indeed, when N = N1, g1(N1)1−hg2(N1)
is larger than one since the first term equals one and the second is > 1. When N = N2,
g1(N2)1−hg2(N2) is lower than one since the second term equals one and the first is < 1.
Figures 1 and 2 illustrates proposition 3.3 for h = 14 and h =
1
2 .
- N︸ ︷︷ ︸ ︸ ︷︷ ︸
︸ ︷︷ ︸ ︸ ︷︷ ︸
︷ ︸︸ ︷ ︷ ︸︸ ︷
aMDU1 > a
SDU
1 a
MDU
1 < a
SDU
1
aMDU2 > a
SDU
2 a
MDU
2 < a
SDU
2
rMDU > rSDU rMDU < rSDU
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Figure 1: h = 14
N1 then defines the critical ”size” beyond which the free-riding effect of the MDU more
then compensates the initial positive effect. N2 defines the critical level beyond which the MDU
structure leads to less research efforts. Too many departments makes competition too fierce,
which induces less effort. As predicted by proposition 3.2, we observe that N1 < N2. This
orderding is explained by the following argument: when the number of department increases,
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aMDU1 < a
SDU
1
aMDU2 > a
SDU
2 a
MDU
2 < a
SDU
2
rMDU > rSDU rMDU < rSDU
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Figure 2: h = 12
the free-riding effects comes into play as well as the competition effect. However, when the
number is small enough the introduction of competition for research funding increases efforts
in the research dimension which increases effort in the teaching dimension as well, because of
the complementarity effect. In other words, because teaching and research activities remain
complements, a bit of competition for research fundings overcomes the free-riding effect.
The numerical approximations for our critical values forN are {N1, N r, N2} = {3, 5.15, 8.66}
for h = 14 and {N1, N r, N2} = {1, 2.62, 6.22} for h = 12 . Although we have not been able to
prove it formally, our computations indicate that all of these treshold values are decreasing
in h. Recall that in this example a larger h means that v(.) is more concave, so that the
marginal contribution of funds to research output is decreasing quickly. By contrast, when
h = 1 the marginal contribution is constant. In other words, a lower h means that redistribution
possibilities become more valuable. It is therefore not surprising that a MDU remains more
efficient than a collection of SDU for a larger number of divisions.
The following corrolary is an immediate consequence of Proposition 3.3.
Corollary 3.2 There exists a unique N∗ > 1 such that the aggregate research output is maximal.
PROOF: N∗ is the maximum of g1(N)1−hg2(N). The derivative of g1(N)1−hg2(N) with respect
to N is (after simplification):
(
N + h− 1
h
)
1
h
1
hN
2
h
(
1
N(N + h− 1) − (2− h))
N∗ is the solution of 1N(N+h−1) = (2 − h). Solving the equation, if h < 1, there is a unique
positive root N∗ = 12 [(1− h) +
√
(1− h)2 + 42−h ]. Clearly N∗ > 1.
This last result shows that in order to maximize the research output, the university should
have some level of diversification. Notice however that N∗ is actually less than 2, whatever the
16
value of h. Accordingly, when we take the restriction N ≥ 2 into account, the desirability of
a multiunit university cannot be evaluated through N∗. The relevant comparison is between
N r and 2. Condition N r > 2 is not satisfied for all h ∈ [0, 1] but our numerical computations
show that N r is decreasing in h. Actually, unless h is large, there always exists a feasible MDU
structure which exhibits a better research output than the corresponding collection of single-unit
divisions. The fact that h cannot be too large is intuitive: Suppose h is arbitrarily close to 1,
then research output (almost) does not depend on research funding. In this case, very few is
to be gained through redistribution opportunities while free-riding already undermines teaching
efforts. On the other hand, is h is smaller, the competition for funds is fiercer. Accordingly, its
positive effects overcome the negative free-riding effect for a larger number of divisions.
3.4 Comparative static analysis
In the previous subsection, we have compared the performance of a MDU university to that
of a collection of single departments. We have shown that MDU induced a trade-off between
teaching and research efforts reflecting the ”free-riding” vs ”yardstick competition” sides of
the MDU coin. In this section, we establish some comparative statics results regarding the
departments’ interdependence that results from the MDU structure. More precisely, what are
the consequences on a∗1i and a∗2i of a change in teaching ability (η1j) and research ability (η2j) of
professor j 6= i. Recall that we have assumed that ability and effort are not perfect substitute
in order to have: ∂a1j∂η1j > 0 and
∂a2j
∂η2j
> 0. Then the analysis of the conditions (3.3) and (3.4)
leads to the following Lemma.
LEMMA 3.2 In a MDU, teaching efforts a1i and a1j are strategic substitutes:
∂a∗1i
∂a1j
< 0
PROOF: An increase in η1j leads to an increase in a1j and then, the university budget B
increases. To measure the effect of a change in η1j on a1i, take the derivative of (3.3) with
respect to a1j :
w[θiv′′(αiB)α2i ]
∂B
∂a1i
∂B
∂a1j
< 0 (3.19)
Clearly, the marginal benefit of teaching for professor i decreases when the budget increases i.e.
when a1j increases.
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Thus teaching efforts are unambiguously strategic substitutes. This illustrates the insur-
ance effect we mentioned. When there are more resources, the individual incentives to create
additional resources diminishes.
On the other hand, the nature of the strategic interaction in research efforts is less clear-cut.
We would like research efforts to be strategic complements. Indeed, in this case, more effort
in one department induces more efforts at the other departments. The benefits of yardstick
competition are clearly dependent on this virtuous circle. Unfortunately, in our MDU, research
efforts a2i and a2j could be either strategic substitutes (
∂a∗2i
∂a2j
< 0) or complements ( ∂a
∗
2i
∂a2j
> 0).
An increase in η2j leads to an increase in a2j and then an increase in θj . To measure the
effect of a change in η2j on a2i, take the derivative of (3.4) with respect to a2j :
w[v′′(αiB)
∂ai
∂θj
B + θiv′(αiB)α′iB
∂αi
∂θj
B + θiv(αiB)
∂α′i
∂θj
B]
∂θi
∂a2i
∂θ2
∂a2j
(3.20)
In order to simplify (3.20) we use the following: αi =
θ
1
h
i∑N
k=1
θ
1
h
k
and α′i =
1
hθi
αi
∑N
k=1,k 6=i αk.
Using the fact that
∑N
k=1 αk = 1, we have
α′i =
1
hθi
αi(1− αi) > 0 (3.21)
∂αi
∂θj
= − 1
hθi
α2i < 0 (3.22)
∂α′i
∂θj
=
1
hθi
∂αi
∂θj
(1− 2αi) (3.23)
Using (3.21), (3.22) and (3.23), we can rewrite (3.20) as follows:
w
∂αi
∂θj
B[v′′(αiB) + v′(αiB)
1
h
αi(1− αi)B + v(αiB) 1
h
(1− 2αi)] ∂θi
∂a2i
∂θ2
∂a2j
(3.24)
The sign of (3.20) will be given by the sign of
v′′(αiB) + v′(αiB)
1
h
αi(1− αi)B + v(αiB) 1
h
(1− 2αi) (3.25)
(3.20) is positive (resp. negative) if (3.25) is negative (resp. positive).
After simplification (3.25) is:
−h2(1− h) + (αiB)2[(2− h)− (3 + h)αi] (3.26)
The sign of this condition is hard to establish since it depends on all the parameters of the
model. If we return to our previous example with symmetric departments, a sufficient condition
for strategic complementarity is:
(2− h)− (3 + h)αi ≤ 0⇒ N ≤ 3 + h2− h
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This condition holds for example for h = 12 and N = 2. If N ≥ 3+h2−h , effort are strategic
substitutes only if the budget is low enough. For low values of B, (3.25) will be negative even
if N ≥ 3+h2−h . It illustrates the fact that competition for resources is more severe when resources
are relatively scarce. When the university is endowed with more resources, research efforts are
strategic substitute i.e. the intensity of competition for resources diminishes.
Thus, we have strict complementarity if budget is low and the αk not too dissimilar, i.e. an
increase in η2j leads to an increase in the research quality of all departments. This conclusion
is no longer valid when large asymmetries prevail.
4 Comments
4.1 Robustness
Section 3 has been devoted to disentangling the nature of the trade-offs between teaching and
research efforts in a multi-department university. Roughly speaking, our analysis suggests that
a mutli-department university may actually acheive some form of redistribution in research
funding among departments without sacrifying efficiency, i.e. while inducing more efforts on
teaching quality and research quality. This is especially true in cases where research output are
heavily dependent on funding levels (h small). Since our model is quite specific, we now question
its robustness to alternative assumptions?
• Mixed Research Funding So far, we assumed that the allocation of the university’s budget
to research projects is a pure winner-picking contest, meaning that the financing of an academic’s
research only depends on the relative quality of its project. This allocation rule has a positive
effect on research incentives due to yardstick competition but a negative effect on teaching
incentives due to free riding. In fact, the absence of reward for the teaching effort is the most
important problem associated with winner-picking, especially when the number of academics is
large.
Obviously, the university could alleviate this problem by departing from winner picking and
allocate its resources not only according to the relative quality of research projects but also
depending on the teaching’s quality, measured for example by the number of students in field
i.12 In fact, in most of the universities, the number of students per departments matters for
deciding on research resources allocation.
12Notice that such a rule is likely to conflict with equity considerations since it introduces a bias in favour of
those disciplines which are lucky enough to attract large cohorts of students simply because of labour market
conditions.
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Limiting the scope of winner picking and integrating the number of students, together with
the project’s relative quality, as a determinant of the budget sharing rule would have positive
effect on teaching incentives since it would make the teaching effort more approriable by the
academic. However, this kind of sharing rule proves hard to use because the university should
ex-ante, that is before the academics choose the efforts, design (and commit to) a sophisticated
sharing rule. As discussed in section 2, full commitment would imply that the university decides
ex-ante the way the budget will be allocated given all possible realizations of nk and θk, k =
1, ..., N . Commitment to such a rule would require that both the number of students and the
projects’ quality are observable and verifiable.13 If it does not seem to be a problem for the
student’s numbers, it is much more demanding in term of information for the projects’ quality.14
Outsiders, such as a court would need a lot of information and a great expertise to verify the
qualities of the research projects.
With non verifiable θ, the university can implement ex-ante two kind of sharing rules: winner
picking and rules based on the number of students only. Despite the non verifiability of θ, winner
picking is implementable since it corresponds to the optimal allocation of resources ex-post (once
they are created). Hence, to implement winner picking, the university simply decide to postpone
the definition of the sharing rule till the budget is known. Rules based on the number of students
create strong incentive for teaching because it reduces the free-riding, but it also reduces the
yardstick competition effect. It is particularly clear in the rule that replicates the stand alone
university: yi = sni, where there is no free riding but no yardstick competition. Rules based
on the number of students (or more generally on teaching quality) reduces the benefits of the
conglomerate structure of a university.
To see how things are going with full commitment and a verifiable project’s quality, let us
consider a particular rule that mixes winner picking with an allocation based on the number of
students. Suppose that the university commits to split the budget B in two parts. a fraction
γ of the budget B will be allocated according to the relative quality of the projects (winner
picking); a fraction 1− γ will be allocated according to the relative number of students enrolled
in the departments. With this rule, the research budget of academic i is:
yi = γαiB + (1− γ)βiB (4.27)
where αi is given by proposition 3.1 and βi = ni∑N
k=1
nk
.
13Recall indeed that only observable and verifiable informations could be included in a contract.
14Remember that the project quality θi is only a part of the final research record ri, the latest being perfectly
observable and verifiable.
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If the university applies the sharing rule given by (4.27), funds could be inefficiently allocated
ex-post: once the nk and θk are realized, there is room for a redistribution that increases the
aggregate research output. Strong commitment by the university is then necessary to apply this
rule.
When the research budget is given by (4.27), the first order conditions read as follows:
Ca1i = w[θiv
′(yi)][(γαi + (1− γ)βi) ∂B
∂a1i
+ (1− γ)B ∂βi
∂a1i
] (4.28)
Ca2i = w[v(yi) + θiv
′(yi)γα′iB]
∂θi
∂a2i
(4.29)
Consider first the incentive to perform research effort. Yardstick competition is still present
but its incentive effect is reduced because the academics compete only for a fraction γ of the
budget. Moreover, for those academics who benefit from a large research financing because a
lot of students attend their field, the benefit of competing for the university budget is lower.
Consider next the teaching effort. There is still free riding because only a fraction of the
incremental budget created by academic i will be invested in his research project, but there
is more incentives to teach because the share of the budget for project i is increasing with
teaching effort by academic i. Hence, the new sharing rule increases the incentives for teaching
and decreases the incentives for research. But because of the complementarity between the two
tasks, the global effect is ambiguous.
To have a more clear picture of the changes induced by γ < 1, let us return to the example
of section 3.3. Given that all academics are identical, in the first order conditions (4.28) and
(4.29), αi and βi can both be replaced by 1N . Solving for the effort levels we have:
aMDU1i = a
SDU
1 g3(N, γ) (4.30)
aMDU2i = a
SDU
2 g4(N, γ) (4.31)
with g4(N, γ) = 1
N
1
h
(hN+(1−h)(n−1)γh )
1+h
2h (1 + (1 − γ)(N − 1)) 1−h2h and g3(N, γ) = [g4(N, γ)(1 +
(1− γ)(N − 1))] 11+h . Notice that g3(N, 1) = g1(N) and g4(N, 1) = g2(N).
The aggregate research output is:
N∑
k=1
rk = Na2iη2(sa1iη1)1−h = Nη2aSDU2 (sη1)
1−h(aSDU1 )
1−hg3(N, γ)1−hg4(N, γ)
If the university sets γ in order to maximize the aggregate research output, we have:
PROPOSITION 4.4 If N ≥ 2, it is efficient to set γ = γ∗ = (1−h)N(N−1)(2−h) with 0 < γ∗ < 1.
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PROOF: γ∗ ≡ maxγ g3(N, γ)1−hg4(N, γ).
With identical academics, there is no distortion in the allocation of resources to the academics
since αi = βi. Hence, there is no loss due to a misallocation of resources ex-post. This would
no longer be true if the academics were different. Selecting γ∗ just reflects the balance between
incentives to teach and to do research. The fact that the university optimally sets γ∗ < 1 means
that it achieves a larger aggregate research output with the redistribution rule (4.27). Hence,
the benefits of conglomerate organization for a university increases when it can makes research
budgets contingent on both the research’s and the teaching’s quality.
• Pay related to performance scheme
In the analysis, we assumed that there is no direct pay related to performance for the
academics and, in particular, there is no reward to teaching. Indeed, for academics, a higher
teaching quality is valuable only because it increases the total research budget. This assumption
can be justified by the fact that teaching quality, unlike research quality, is difficult to assess.
Moreover, if research quality is comparable across academics in the same field, measures of
teaching quality are often institution specific, hence less comparable. Suppose however that
the university designs a measure of teaching quality. Typically this measure could result from
students’ assessments. Denote by qi a proxy for the teaching quality by professor i. The
relevant measure of teaching quality should be correlated with teaching effort and teaching
talent: qi(a1i, η1i) with ∂qi1∂ai1 > 0 and
∂qi1
∂ηi1
> 0.
With observable teaching quality qi, the market value of a professor i is now: w[ri + δqi]
where δ is the weight given to teaching. Integrating this pay structure in the academic’s utility
function, the first order condition of the optimization problem are:
Ca1i = w[θiv
′(αiB)αi]
∂B
∂a1i
+ wδ
∂qi
∂a1i
(4.32)
and (3.4) which remains unchanged.
Obviously, the effect on optimal teaching effort is posisitve. Moreover, the more precise is
the quality measure, the more positive the impact. Given lemma 3.1 we may also conclude that
research efforts will increase as well.
• Alternative Financing Sources
A key feature of our model is that departments rely exclusively on the University central bud-
get to finance research. Obviously, realife departments have also access to alternative source of
funding. We will not address here the possible funding related to consultancy, and more generally
private funding related to appplied research. Obviously, the incentives to rely on such sources
are larger when basic research efforts are less appropriable. Aside from consultancy, academics
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may also rely on institutional funds to finance their basic research. Obviously, academics also
face yardstick competition for these funds. Moreover, their competitors are in general working
in a similar discipline, so that competition is likely to be tougher. It therefore seems reasonable
to consider that research effort is likely to be larger there. However, the key implication of these
fundings is that they are unrelated to the result of teaching efforts. Accordingly, wider access to
these funds breaks the complementarity between teaching and research efforts. Notice here that
the argument equally applies to SDUs and MDUs. However, because the MDU already faces a
free-riding problem in the teaching activitiy, the negative impact of these external fundings on
teaching efforts could actually be stronger.
4.2 Related Literature
• Career Concerns
There is no direct incentive or performance related to pay in our model. Rather, the model
relies on implicit incentives where current actions influence future opportunities. To put it
differently, implicit incentives mean that the university cannot control the per-unit reward w.
This incentive structure shares features of the career concern model of Holmstro¨m (1982)
and Dewatripont et. al. (1999a, 1999b). We should stress however that our framework differs
from career concern ones in a fundamental respect. In the career concern model, the agent’s pay
reflects the market’s expectation of the unknown agent’s talent given the observables. Applied
to our framework, this means that wri is the expected wage of a professor on the academic
market, given observables i.e. given research records. In this case, the market would pay the
academics according to their perceived talent. Clearly, the market will use the research output
to assess the talent of an academic, and the academic’s pay will increase with the research
output. But market assessment of research talent would also take into account the amount
available for research of professor i. And to make correct assessment about the research budget
yi, the market needs to infer the value of the total budget B and the redistribution rules that
apply within the university. If it is common knowledge that the university allocates its budget
in order to maximize the aggregate research output (an assumption we make in this model)
the market expectation of the budget yi will depend on the expectation of the unknown talents
η2j of all professors j = 1, ..., N within the same university since redistribution will be based
not only on the project’s quality θi but also on the qualities of the other projects θj as all
professors compete for the same budget. Moreover, the market should evaluate the total budget
size, which depends on the expectation of the unknown talents η1j , j = 1, ..., N . Hence, the
market value of professor i depends on his observed research output but also on the observed
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research output of his colleague in other fields. This would make the model extremely difficult
to solve. We then take another route and assume the benefit of research is simply proportional
to the professor’s research output. Accordingly, our model cannot be viewed as a career concern
model. The market values identically a research record resulting from a high effort and/or high
talent than a research record resulting from a poor talent but a large research budget. Hence,
we consider a myopic market, where the professor’s value depends only on his observable: his
research achievement ri.
• Conglomerates
Our analysis can be viewed as an application of the more general literature on conglomerate,
for profit, firms. The literature on conglomerate firms identifies two important features of
conglomerates which are also present in the framework we adopt for universities.
(1) Brusco and Panuzzi (2002) and Gautier and Heider (2002) show that the fund raising
activities at the division level are strategic substitutes when the conglomerate’s headquarter
redistributes the resources ex-post across the divisions. Winner-picking (Stein, 1997) has innate
agency costs: when the scare resources are redistributed, managerial incentives to create these
resources are weaker. Redistribution (a) reduces the investment cash flow sensitivity and (b)
insures the divisional manager against failure at the fund raising stage. Thereby, it reduces the
managerial incentives to produce resource. The existence of these agency costs is independent
of the fact that the conglomerate redistribute the resources efficiently or not (independent of
the fact that the fraction αi of fund allocated to division i is computed or not to maximize the
total firm value) but it arises when the budget constraint applies at the conglomerate level. In
this respect, our results adds two insights: first the value of the conglomerate depends on the
number of divisions and second, the weak side of the conglomerate (lack of incentives for raising
funds) can be overcome. In our model, the multi-dimensional structure may actually induce
more efforts on the ”raising funds” activity.
(2) Inderst and Laux (2002) show that developments of projects’ quality are strategic com-
plements activities accross divisions when the divisions are not too dissimilar ex-ante. In their
model, the conglomerate resources are given but not the division’s future value. Resources are
allocated by the corporate headquarter to the most valuable projects. If the project’s quality
depends on a managerial effort, agglomerating divisions in a single firm increases the incentives
to produce valuable projects. Integrating activities mean that the resource allocation process
is based on the relative qualities of the projects. Competition for producing valuable projects
increases the managerial incentives. Notice that the strategic complementarity property arises
only if the conglomerate allocates the resources efficiently i.e. only if the conglomerate’s head-
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quarter picks the winners.
In the present paper, we combine the two dimensions in a mutlitasking framework. This
is in contrast with the literature on conglomerate considers only single task problems: either
the managers should receive incentive to produce resources, the future value of projects being
given (1) or managers should receive incentives to develop projects, the resources being given
(2). This paper considers a multi-task problem, where the resources and the projects’ value
are endogenous and result from the performance of a manager (professor). In this respect, the
present paper suggests that the benefits of a conglomerate structure essentially depend on the
number of divisions, i.e. the value of diversification has to be linked with the level (or degree)
of diversification.
5 Final Remarks
Universities are most often organized as multi-unit departments headed by a single central
authority. They also obtain a very significant share of their funds from enrollment fees and/or
per students subsidies. Universities are asked to perform well in teaching and research activities,
In this respect, a multi-unit organization allows for a redistribution of research funds which
may be relatively independent of the origin of funds. However, it is often argued that such a
redistribution weakens academics’ incentives to perform well in their teaching duties. This is
especially intuitive if the bulk of an academic pay and prestige depends on research records
rather than teaching performance.
In this paper, we show that the multi-unit organization of universities is not incompatible
with improved performance in both teaching and research. In other words, the lack of direct
incentives towards teaching activities can be overcome. Central to this result is the organization
of yardstick competition between departments which combined with the strategic complemen-
tarity between teaching and research may promote teaching and research efforts. However, the
number of departments cannot be too large.
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